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Non-technical summary
Basic income schemes are discussed among all political parties in Germany. A basic in-
come is a specific form of a guaranteed minimum income for every citizen. Distributed
unconditionally it could simplify the current German welfare state by replacing the numer-
ous means-tested welfare transfers. The proposed basic income schemes combine several
different instruments like a negative income tax, a flat tax system and lump sum payments
for health insurance. The concepts discussed differ in crucial design parameters mainly
in the level of guaranteed income.
We focus our analysis on the prominent proposal by the conservative party (Christian
Democratic Union – CDU). By introducing their proposal of an unconditional basic in-
come, all means-tested social transfers would be replaced by a negative income tax scheme
that guarantees every citizen a minimum income, regardless of whether he or she is in
work or unemployed. Social security payments would be substituted by a payroll tax for
employers and a tax-financed basic pension would replace the current pension scheme.
The transfer withdrawal rate would be considerably reduced to 50% and a flat tax rate
of 25% is suggested.
Our paper analyzes the effects of the proposed basic income reform and two budget-neutral
alternatives on labor supply and income distribution. A special focus lies on the work
incentives for secondary earners in the family context. We use a detailed microsimulation
model for the German tax system to simulate the reform and a structural household
labor supply model for the estimations. The analyses are based on the micro data of the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
Our results show that the originally proposed basic income concept yields a very high
deficit. Therefore, we also study two budget neutral alternatives. Introducing the orig-
inally proposed reform, our model predicts a large increase of labor supply due to high
working incentives caused by the low tax rate. But raising the tax rate in order to meet
the criteria of budget neutrality, labor supply adjustments turn negative. By comparing
labor supply and distributional effects of the budget neutral alternatives, we observe that
positive labor supply reactions coincide with increasing inequality, which indicates the
general equity-efficiency trade-off. Furthermore, the unconditional character of the basic
income causes especially for families a strong increase in incomes, which affects labor
supply of couple households negative. At the same time the basic income concept itself
generates serious disincentives for secondary earners.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Zur Reformierung des Sozialstaates werden in Deutschland verschiedene Grundeinkom-
menskonzepte diskutiert. Ein besonders prominentes Konzept ist das von Dieter Althaus
vorgeschlagene Solidarische Bu¨rgergeld. Ziel eines solchen Grundeinkommens soll u.a. die
Entkopplung der sozialen Absicherung von der Erwerbsarbeit sein. Dadurch soll der Ar-
beitslosigkeit sowie nicht existenzsichernden Einkommen entgegengewirkt werden, ohne
die Finanzierbarkeit des Sozialstaates zu gefa¨hrden.
Das bedingungslose Grundeinkommen sieht vor, mit Hilfe einer negativen Einkommens-
steuer jedem Bu¨rger ein Mindesteinkommen in Ho¨he von 600 Euro zu sichern. Alle bis-
herigen Sozialtransfers zur Grundsicherung wu¨rden durch das Grundeinkommen ersetzt
werden. Der Reformvorschlag entha¨lt außerdem eine Bu¨rgerpauschale fu¨r die Kranken-
versicherung sowie die Umstellung der Gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung auf eine steuer-
finanzierte Bu¨rgergeldrente. Die Finanzierung des Grundeinkommens soll u¨ber eine zwei-
stufige ”flat tax”mit einer Transferentzugsrate von 50 Prozent und einem einheitlichen
Steuersatz von 25 Prozent erfolgen.
Unser Beitrag analysiert die Effekte des Althaus-Vorschlags sowie zweier budget-neutraler
Alternativen auf das Arbeitsangebot und die Einkommensverteilung. Dabei liegt ein be-
sonderes Augenmerk auf den Arbeitsanreizen fu¨r Zweitverdiener im Familienkontext. Wir
verwenden ein detailiertes Mikrosimulationsmodell zur Simulation der Reform und ein
strukturelles Modell zur Scha¨tzung des Arbeitsangebots. Die Analysen basieren auf den
Daten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels.
Unsere Simulationsergebnisse zeigen, dass die Einfu¨hrung des Solidarischen Bu¨rgergeldes
zu einem Defizit im Staatshaushalt gegenu¨ber dem Status quo in Ho¨he von ca. 250 Milli-
arden Euro fu¨hren wu¨rde. Wir betrachten daher zusa¨tzlich zwei budgetneutrale Alterna-
tiven: Eine Variante mit ho¨herem Steuersatz und eine Variante mit ho¨herer Transferent-
zugsrate. Die Ergebnisse unserer Analysen zeigen, dass aufgrund der niedrigen Steuersa¨tze
des Althaus-Vorschlags das Arbeitsangebot steigen wu¨rde, wa¨hrend die beiden budget-
neutralen Alternativen ein sinkendes Arbeitsangebot zur Folge ha¨tten. Der Vergleich der
Arbeitsangebots- und Verteilungseffekte zeigt, dass bei positiver Entwicklung des Ar-
beitsangebots negative Auswirkungen auf die Einkommensverteilung zu erwarten sind
und umgekehrt. Dies zeigt den generellen Zielkonflikt zwischen Effizienz und Gleichheit.
Desweitern fu¨hrt der Verzicht auf eine Bedarfspru¨fung insbesondere fu¨r Familien zu stark
ansteigenden Einkommen und somit zu einem hohen Einkommenseffekt, der sich negativ
auf das Arbeitsangebot von Paarhaushalten auswirkt. Gleichzeitig erzeugt das Grundein-
kommenskonzept an sich noch zusa¨tzlich negative Arbeitsanreize fu¨r Zweitverdiener.
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Abstract
In this paper we estimate the effects of an unconditional basic income on labor
supply and income distribution with a special focus on the incentives to work in the
family context. An unconditional basic income guarantees every citizen a minimum
income without any means-testing. We simulate a proposed basic income reform
with a detailed microsimulation model, estimate labor supply reactions with a struc-
tural labor supply model and perform distributional analysis using micro data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel. As the originally proposed basic income concept
yields a very high deficit, we also analyze two budget neutral alternatives. Compar-
ing labor supply and distributional results of the budget neutral alternatives, the
well-known equity-efficiency trade-off is unveiled. In the family context our ana-
lyzes suggest that the unconditional character of the basic income causes increasing
family incomes, but also serious disincentives to work for secondary earners.
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1 Introduction
The idea of a basic income was very popular in Germany during the 1980s Opielka &
Vobruba (1986), Schmid (1984).1 Recently the idea has reappeared in public discussions.
Basic Income schemes are a specific form of a guaranteed minimum income, distributed
either unconditionally or means-tested to every citizen via a lump sum payment or a
negative income tax. Since unemployment rates, in particular for low-skilled workers,
are very high in Germany and income distribution has widened (OECD 2007, 2008),
proponents of a basic income hope to tackle these developments by granting unconditional
transfers. An additional aim of basic income concepts is the simplification of Germany’s
tax and transfer system, which has been an important issue on the political agenda for
some years now.
Different schemes are discussed in Germany among all political parties. The concepts
differ in crucial design parameters, most notably in the level of guaranteed income. We
focus on the quite modest proposal by the conservative party (CDU – Christian Demo-
cratic Union), which is based on a relatively moderate basic income (Althaus 2007). The
introduction of such an unconditional transfer would replace all social transfers by a nega-
tive income tax scheme that guarantees every citizen a minimum income regardless of the
employment status. The reform proposal combines several instruments such as a change
to individual taxation, a negative income tax, a flat tax system and lump sum payments
for health insurance.
Recent studies analyze the effects of this basic income reform proposal in the German
context with respect to the public budget and labor supply. Opielka & Strengmann-
Kuhn (2007) and Straubhaar & Hohenleitner (2007) focus on the question whether a
basic income reform is financially feasible and how the tax parameters need to be chosen
for a budget neutral reform. Straubhaar & Hohenleitner (2007) also consider effects on
the labor market. Their stylized model suggests positive labor supply reactions. The
Structural labor supply estimations by Bonin & Schneider (2007) also predict positive
labor supply reactions with an increase of about 600,000 full-time equivalents (FTE). 2.
Fuest & Peichl (2009) find only slightly positive labor supply effects. All studies clearly
show that a basic income concept with the originally proposed tax parameters would yield
a high financial deficit.
The international literature on basic income and the related field of a negative income tax
also addresses the consequences of a basic income for families. A study on a basic income
1The Concept of a ”Basic Income” emerged with the ideas on a negative income tax of Rhys-Williams
(1953) and Friedman (1962). So far, only Brasil and Alaska have introduced a Basic Income. In January
2008 Namibia introduced a project called ”Basic Income Grant” with a testing phase of 2 years.
2One FTE is equivalent to a full-time worker, while an FTE of 0.5 represents a person working only
half-time. We define a full-time position to be 38 hours per week
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for Ireland for example shows (i) that high tax rates are necessary to refinance the basic
income payments, (ii) that especially women benefit from individualized payments and in
consequence (iii) that married women refrain from the labor market, as they react more
sensitive to income changes (Callan et al. 2000). Similar in a study on a negative income
tax as a special form of a basic income, Paulus (1991) describes that a basic income would
lead to a decreasing labor force participation of women and therefore consolidates existing
role patterns in the Netherlands. Although negative income tax schemes and universal
basic income schemes are similar and can yield the same income distribution, they are
different redistributive programs. Negative income tax systems follow the libertarian idea,
while a basic income is in line with an egalitarian concept (Tonadi 2009).
Our paper analyzes the effects of the proposed conservative basic income reform and two
budget-neutral alternatives – one with an adjusted tax rate and one with an adjusted
withdrawal rate – on labor supply and income distribution. We calculate, to our knowl-
edge, for the first time labor supply effects of two budget neutral alternatives and add
distributional analysis to the literature on basic income. Furthermore, our paper extends
the literature by a special focus on the family context investigating the (dis-)incentives
for secondary earners induced by the basic income and a high income effect.
We use a detailed microsimulation model for the German tax system and a structural
household labor supply model. The estimations are based on micro data from the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Overall, we confirm the very positive labor supply
reactions of the earlier literature on the originally proposed reform, but labor supply re-
actions turn negative for the budget neutral alternatives. A high tax rate yields negative
labor supply reactions, while the income inequality of the status quo seems to be miti-
gated in this case. In contrast, a high withdrawal rate affects labor supply not as negative,
but seems to widen the income distribution. This illustrates the general equity-efficiency
trade-off. Our results also suggest that the family context is very important for a basic
income reform. Especially women living in couple households reduce their labor supply,
because of a high basic income for children and the estimated high leisure preference for
women. Moreover, the original reform concept and the alternative with a high withdrawal
rate create disincentives to work for secondary earners due to a simultaneous introduction
of individual taxation and a negative income tax.
In the next section we discuss the basic income concept and its theoretical implications
for labor supply (Section 2). Section 3 subsequently provides a description of the data
and the structural household labor supply model. Simulation results are given in Section
4 for the originally proposed basic income and in Section 5 for the two budget neutral
alternatives. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Basic Income Reform
The basic income reform proposal discussed within the German conservative party aims
at a comprehensive reform of welfare and tax policy. It combines several separately
discussed instruments such as a change to individual taxation, a negative income tax,
a flat tax system, lump sum payments for health insurance and a tax financed pension.
The next subsection explains the current welfare and tax system and the basic income
concept in more detail. Subsequently, we discuss the implications of the reform proposal
with regard to labor supply on a theoretical basis.
2.1 Status Quo and Basic Income Concept
In 2005 a large welfare reform was introduced in Germany that combined payments of
social and unemployment assistance. Nevertheless, the German welfare state is currently
still based on many different social transfers granted on the basis of means-testing. In-
come is taxed in a progressive system (i.e. average tax rates increase monotonically with
increasing taxable income) with tax rates ranging from 0% to 42%. A lack of transparency
due to many different tax deduction possibilities is often criticized. Further, Couples can
choose to be assessed jointly, which implies that the couples income is split in half to de-
termine the tax rate which is then applied on the couples total income. The progression
of the tax system then leads to a splitting advantage. As single earner households benefit
the most from the income splitting, the current tax system with joint assessment creates
disincentives for secondary earners (Steiner & Wrohlich 2004).
In contrast to the status quo, the tax system of the proposed basic income is designed as
a two-stage flat tax system as shown in Equation 1. Individual i with a gross income Yi
below the threshold of 1
t1
BI is taxed with the rate of t1 and receives a basic income BI.
Additionally, everyone needs to pay a health lump sum tax H in the basic income system,
while the current health care system is based on a public health insurance financed equally
by employers and employees. In 2005 employer and employee needed to pay 15.5% of the
employees gross labor income. 3 Tax payments Ti result in the basic income concept.
They can be negative due to the basic income payments. Individuals above the income
threshold are taxed with the rate t2, their basic income amounts to
t2
t1
BI and they pay
the same amount H for health care. Tax payments for individuals earning above the
threshold are always positive, but the basic income reduces their tax burden just like a
tax credit.
3Self-employed, civil servants and persons with an income above a certain threshold can opt out of
the public system and use a private health insurance.
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Ti =
t1Yi −BI +H if 0 < Yi < 1t1BIt2Yi − t2t1BI +H if Yi ≥ 1t1BI (1)
The design of the basic income concept thus depends on the tax parameters, the level of
the basic income and the health lump sum tax. The original proposal suggests a basic
income (BI) of 800 Euro for persons earning below the threshold and a health lump sum
tax (H) of 200 Euro. Thus, an income of 600 Euro is guaranteed for every adult citizen
without any earned income (Yi = 0). This amount is proposed as it is similar to the
subsistence level in Germany.4 The tax rate (t1) can be considered as a withdrawal rate
and is set to 50%. Hence, an individual earning less than the threshold needs to pass half
of it’s labor income to the state. For persons with a higher income the reform concept
suggests a tax (t2) of 25%. Consequently, the basic income, or more precisely the tax
credit, amounts to 400 Euro for them. With this parameters the threshold for the lower
tax rate amounts to a gross income of 1,600 Euro. In addition to this tax system, the
concept also suggests a basic income of 500 Euro for every child. As children also need to
pay 200 Euro for health insurance, parents receive a net transfer of 300 Euro per child.
This is twice as much as the child benefit of 2005.
Figure 1 illustrates the described basic income tax system (solid line) in comparison to
the status quo tax scheme (dashed lines). It depicts for different gross incomes of a single
household without children the corresponding income tax and social security contributions
(SSC). In the basic income system individuals with an income below the threshold of 1,600
Euro are taxed with a higher rate (50%) than individuals with a higher income (25%).
This is reflected by the different slopes of the solid line. A negative income tax results
up to 1,200 Euro, while individuals with an income between 1,200 Euro and 1,600 Euro
already pay positive taxes due to the health payments. A comparison between the basic
income tax scale and the status quo shows that the post reform tax payments are lower for
almost all gross incomes. Especially, persons with a high income benefit from a reduction
of the tax burden.
Besides the changes in the tax system, another important aspect is the abolition of all
social benefits, which are only paid on the basis of means-testing in the status quo.
Social benefits includes for example unemployment assistance (short term), unemployment
benefits (long-term) and benefits for housing, children and education. The basic income in
form of a negative income tax, which is granted without means-testing, should substitute
all these welfare payments. Additionally, all tax deductions are abolished and the current
4The subsistence level for 2008 has been calculated by the German government (Deutscher Bundestag
2006) and amounts to 595 Euro per month for a single person.
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Figure 1: Tax-Transfer Scheme for Singles Without Children
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pay-as-you-go pension scheme is replaced by a tax-financed basic income pension, granted
on top of the regular basic income for retirees aged 67 and above. The amount of the
basic pension depends on the previous income and the duration of employment, and is
limited to a maximum amount of 600 Euro. The pensions are financed by a 12% payroll
tax for the employers, who in return do not need to pay social security contributions any
longer.5These modifications point out the appealing simplicity of a basic income concept,
that could indeed reduce the complexity of the current tax system.
2.2 Basic Income and Labor Supply Theory
The introduction of the proposes basic income reform would change Germany’s joint
taxation system to one with individual taxation. Such a shift is important for labor supply
decisions of couple households, because their net income decreases due to the abolished
splitting advantage. At the same time disincentives for secondary earner created by
joint assessment do not affect their labor supply any longer. Simulating the introduction
of separate taxation Steiner & Wrohlich (2004) show that the average net income would
decline substantially in West Germany and only moderate in East Germany. Labor supply
of women in couple households would increase and a significant number of husbands would
exit the labor market.
5Regarding the current pension scheme there needs to be a transition period, as old claims must be
fulfilled. The extra financing necessary for the transition period cannot be considered in our analysis.
Here we only provide a long-run analysis of the basic income reform, in the sense that claims of the
current pension system do not exist any longer.
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But a basic income system would not only induce a change from joint to individual
taxation, but would also introduce a negative income tax. The literature on the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) (Eissa & Hoynes 2004, Hotz & Scholz 2006, Scholz 1996) and
the Working Families‘ Tax Credit (WFTC) (Blundell 2000, Blundell & Walker 2002) can
give first insights on labor supply reactions due to a negative income tax. The EITC is a
negative income tax in the USA that is based on the family income and is only granted
as an in-work benefit. Hotz & Scholz (2006) present a study on the EITC showing that it
affects labor supply (extensive margin) in general positive. Due to the in-work character
of the negative income tax, the positive effects on the extensive margin are in line with
labor supply theory. But for an unconditional basic income, i.e. a negative income tax
independent of the employment status, we cannot expect these positive incentives on a
theoretical basis. Furthermore, the literature shows that working hours (intensive margin)
seem to decrease slightly with the introduction of the EITC for people already being
employed as well as for secondary earners. Secondary earners face direct disincentives to
participate on the labor market due to the EITC being based on the family income, as
the income of a secondary earner often leads to a cessation of EITC payments (Eissa &
Hoynes 2004). This kind of disincentives should not be relevant for the basic income, as
payments are based on the individual and not on the family income.
Figure 2, however, illustrates that the distribution of earned income between the spouses
affects the household net income also in the basic income concept. The solid line indicates
gross and the according net income for single earner households (100/0), the dashed line
for households in which one spouse earns 80% of the gross income (80/20) and the dotted
line for households sharing work equally (50/50). For gross incomes below the threshold of
1,600 Euro per month net incomes do not depend on the households’ decision, since each
partner – regardless of the work constellation – is subject to a withdrawal rate of 50% and
receives a basic income of 800 Euro. Above the threshold net incomes are optimized in
case of a single earner household. For these households the labor income is taxed with the
low rate of 25%, the working spouse receives a tax credit of 400 Euro and the non-working
spouse additionally receives the full basic income of 800 Euro. Every Euro a secondary
earner would earn is taxed with the higher withdrawal rate of 50%, as long as the second
income is below the threshold. Hence, a household benefits more from a single earner
increasing his labor supply than from a secondary earner entering the labor market with
a low income. A disincentive to share work equally exists even if both partners earn above
the threshold and therefore are taxed with the lower rate. In this case the income of both
partners is taxed with 25%, but they also only receive a tax credit of 400 Euro. Instead,
a single earner household with the same gross income would receive the 800 Euro basic
income for the non-working spouse. The disincentive for a secondary earner, thus, exactly
equals the difference between the full basic income (800 Euro) and the lower tax credit
(400 Euro).
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Figure 2: The Intra-household Working Decision: Original Basic Income
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Besides these labor supply disincentives in the family context, a basic income can also
induce an income effect with negative labor supply reactions for all household types.
This is the case, if the negative income tax exceeds the current social transfers or if net
income rises due to lower tax rates. Moreover, the high basic income for children must
be considered as an additional positive income effect for households with children. But a
reform that lowers tax rates also causes a substitution effect increasing labor supply due
to rising hourly net earnings. Whether the income or substitution effect is more important
for a basic income reform depends on the assigned tax parameters and therefore can only
be answered on an empirical basis.
3 Data and Structural Labor Supply Model
We use micro-data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which is a yearly
panel of about 12,000 representative households including approximately 23,000 people
above the age of 16 years. The data includes many socio-demographic variables, such
as information on actual employment status, working hours and gross income.6 In our
analysis we use data of the year 2004. As most of the people are surveyed in the first half
of a year, we complement the data with retrospective information from 2005 to obtain
more precise information about the households.
For the calculation of taxes, social security contributions, benefits and the according net
incomes, we use a very detailed microsimulation model (Clauss & Schubert 2009) for
6See also Wagner et al. (2007).
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the German tax and transfer system. As the simulations are based on the gross hourly
wage rates, which we derive from the observed gross income, we have to impute wages
for unemployed individuals. Hence, we estimate a Mincer-type wage equation and correct
for sample selection as proposed by Heckman (1976). In a base simulation, we calculate
the net incomes according to the legislation in 2004. As in 2005 a comprehensive welfare
reform was introduced, we then simulate the net incomes for the legislation in 2005 and
refer to the results after this simulation as the status quo. In order to simulate the effects
of a basic income in comparison to the status quo, we also simulate the basic income
scenario. The simulated net incomes of the status quo and the basic income scenario
are the basis of our labor supply estimation and are therefore transferred to a structural
household labor supply model.
In our labor supply model, according to van Soest (1995), individuals choose the working
hour category (Hj where j = 1, . . . , J) with the highest attributed utility among a finite
discrete set of hour categories. The choice set of working hours for men and women
includes {0, 15, 30, 38, 47} hours, with zero hours for non-participation, 15 to 30 hours
for part-time employment, 38 hours for full-time employment and 47 hours for overtime.
Married or cohabiting couples choose between the different hour combinations and jointly
maximize their utility. We specify utility as a linear translog function of income and
leisure:
U(x) = x′Ax+ β′x+  (2)
The vector x contains the logarithmic variables of net incomes as well as leisure time for the
different hour categories. The behavioral parameters are represented by the vector β and
the symmetric matrix A. The parameters are also influenced by further covariates (e.g.
age, education, number of children, regional dummy for Eastern Germany, nationality)
included in x to control for heterogeneity in leisure preferences. The unobserved part is
defined by  which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid) and
to follow a Gumbel or type I extreme value distribution.
According to McFadden (Mc Fadden 1974) the probability of choosing category k instead
of category l out of m possible hour categories can be estimated using the following logit
function:
Prk(Uk > Ul) = Pr(X = k) =
exp(x′kAxk + β
′xk)∑
m exp(x
′
mAxm + β
′xm)
,∀l 6= k (3)
The parameters of this conditional logit model are estimated using the maximum like-
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lihood approach. For the estimation of the model we need to assume the independence
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA-assumption). That means that the calculated probabilities
for choosing category k instead of category l are independent of the other alternatives. If
the alternatives differ substantially from one another, it is likely that the IIA-assumption
holds. But it can be problematic to assume the independence of other alternatives, if
some categories are similar and, therefore, can be considered close substitutes.
Our distributional analysis compares simulated net incomes of the status quo legislation
in 2005 with simulated net incomes after a basic income reform. We take labor supply
reactions into account by recalculating net incomes after the labor supply estimations.
Using equivalence weighted incomes, we perform a percentile analysis to identify the
winners and losers of the reform along the income distribution. In addition, the Gini
coefficient and the Atkinson measures (Atkinson 1970) indicate changes with respect to
income inequality. For the calculation of inequality measures after labor supply responses
we use the pseudo distribution method described in Creedy et al. (2004).7
4 Results for the Original Basic Income
One major constraint for the introduction of a basic income is the public budget. There-
fore, we compare calculated revenues and expenditures of the status quo with calculated
revenues and expenditures of the reform scenario before labor supply adjustments in Ta-
ble 1. In the status quo expenditures – mainly social benefits – exceed revenues, thus
yielding a deficit of 13 billion Euro. Revenues in the basic income system include income
tax (116.6 billion Euro) and pay roll taxes of employers (102.0 billion Euro), while basic
income and basic rent payments add up to calculated expenditures of 477.7 billion Euro.
This results in a negative balance of 259.1 billion Euro in case of a basic income. Hence,
the basic income cannot be implemented in a budget-neutral fashion. Instead the balance
of revenues and expenditures in the basic income setting exceeds the deficit of the status
quo by 246.1 billion Euro. The additional deficit is mainly driven by low withdrawal and
tax rates and generous basic income transfers.
7Since the discretisation of the hours leads to a loss in accuracy, the pseudo distribution method
uses the estimated probabilities of each hour category which are multiplied with the household weighting
factor, to approximate the real income distribution. Creedy et al. (2004) showed that this method
produces accurate values of the income inequality measures in a probabilistic choice framework and is
superior to other methods (i.e. expected income method).
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Table 1: Effects on the Public Budget
Billion Euro / Year
Revenues Status Quo 163.9
Expenditures Status Quo 176.9
Balance Status Quo -13.0
Revenues Basic Income
Income tax 116.6
pay roll tax employers 102.0
Expenditures Basic Income
Basic Income 273.1
Basic Income (children) 86.1
Basic Pension 98.4
Basic Pension (widows) 20.1
Balance Basic Income -259.1
Balance Basic Income vs. Status Quo -246.1
Data Source: SOEP 2004, own calculations.
On the positive side, the low withdrawal and tax rates yield high work incentives at the
extensive and intensive margin. We observe an increase in labor supply by about 1.19
million full-time equivalents (FTE). Table 2 shows that participation overall increases by
562,078 persons (2.42%). Men (+470,986 persons) react more sensitive to lower taxes
then women (+91,092 persons). Female and male single households as well as men living
in couple households participate more often after the reform, but participation of women
living in couple households decreases. 141,748 (1.23%) women living in a couple household
stop working due to the disincentives for secondary earners (see Section 2.2)and their high
leisure preferences (see Appendix A.3). The disincentives for secondary earners created by
the basic income tax scheme seem to be even larger than the disadvantages of the current
joint taxation system. Thus, for secondary earners in couple households the income effect
caused by the simultaneous introduction of a negative income tax and individual taxation
dominates the substitution effect due to lower tax rates. With regard to the intensive
margin (working hours) we actually observe positive effects for all subgroups. In total,
working hours increase by 602,316 full-time equivalents. Working hours of men increases
by 2.20% (271,011 FTE), while women’s working time even rises by 3.72% (331,305 FTE).
Thus, for many women in couple households the income effect outweighs the substitution
effect and they refrain from the labor market, but for some the substitution effect is more
important and they extend their working hours.
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Table 2: Labor Supply Effects - Original Basic Income
Participation Working Hours Total
Persons % FTE % FTE %
Total 562,078 2.42 602,316 2.84 1,190,189 5.61
Men 470,986 3.92 271,011 2.20 750,325 6.08
Women 91,092 0.81 331,305 3.72 439,865 4.94
Singles
Men 170,471 5.19 89,374 3.76 260,310 10.96
Women 232,821 6.78 138,868 5.28 340,512 12.94
Couples
Men 300,470 3.13 181,637 2.01 490,014 5.42
Women -141,748 -1.23 192,436 3.30 99,353 1.71
Data Source: SOEP 2004, own calculations.
Furthermore, we compute monthly gains and losses per capita by deciles of disposable
income in the status quo in order to identify which households benefit from the introduc-
tion of a basic income across the income distribution. Results of the percentile analysis
after labor supply adjustments are depicted in Figure 3. All deciles benefit from the in-
troduction with a very high increase of households´ monthly net income. The net income
for households in the lower deciles rises because they are eligible to a negative income
tax (basic income) and because of a lower withdrawal rate. Gains for persons in the
upper part of the income distribution are even higher. Reducing the tax rate to 25%
for all incomes over 1,600 Euro yields monthly gains of over 600 Euro per capita for
the total population. Couples with no children in general gain less than average and we
even observe losses for them in the middle of the income distribution. Losses for couple
households are possible due to the change from joint taxation to individual taxation, as
they suffer from the abolishment of the splitting advantage. In contrast, couples with one
child gain more than average in all deciles. Generous basic income payments for children
increase their net incomes additionally. Overall, the large increases in net incomes across
the whole income distribution are not very surprising given that a basic income with such
generous tax and transfer parameters yields a deficit of about 246 billion Euro.
Inequality measures summarize the information of the percentile analysis and indicate that
the income distribution has widened. The Gini coefficient would rise from 0.26 to 0.28.
This result is also supported by the Atkinson measure A(), which can indicate changes
in different segments of the income distribution. The index becomes more sensitive to
changes at the lower end of the income distribution as  approaches 1. We calculate the
Atkinson measures A(0.5) and A(1). Both measures increase – A(0.5) from 0.05 to 0.06
and A(1) from 0.10 to 0.12 – indicating that especially the upper deciles gain with respect
to their net income.
Our results are in line with the earlier literature on the budgetary and labor supply effects
of a basic income in Germany. The proposed basic income would yield a large budgetary
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Figure 3: Percentile Analysis: Original Basic Income
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Data Source: SOEP 2004, own calculations.
deficit and due to low tax rates labor supply would increase in total. But interestingly,
we find that only men and single women increase their labor supply, while many women
living in couple households refrain from the labor market. In addition, our distribution
analysis shows that the income distribution indeed has widened despite the high transfer
payments.
5 Results for the Budget Neutral Alternatives
We further analyze two alternative reform scenarios that yield budget neutrality and
thereby extend the existing literature. For the first alternative we increase revenues by
adjusting the tax rate. For the second alternative we adjust the withdrawal rate. In both
cases the basic income is fixed at 800 Euro (500 Euro for children) and health lump sum
payments still amount to 200 Euro. Thus, every citizen with no income still receives a
transfer of 600 Euro in the two alternative basic income settings.
For the first alternative it is necessary to increase the tax rate (t2) to 61.3% in order to
yield a budget neutral reform before labor supply adjustments. Following Equation 1 the
tax credit in this scenario then amounts to 981 Euro instead of 400 Euro in the original
proposed reform. All Citizens up to a gross income of 1,200 Euro again benefit from a
negative income tax. But the intra-household working decision described in Section 2.2
for the original basic income concept changes as we adjust the tax rate and consequently
the tax credit. Figure 4 shows that the household decision is again irrelevant as long as
everyone’s income lies below the threshold of 1,600 Euro. From this point on households
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Figure 4: The Intra-household Working Decision: Alternative with Adjusted Tax Rate
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sharing work equally yield the highest net incomes in this alternative basic income reform.
As the tax rate in this scenario is higher than the withdrawal rate it is optimal to avoid
high taxes by sharing income equally between the spouses. If the gross income is too
high to avoid high tax rates for both spouses, then sharing employment is still optimal in
comparison to a single earner household, because the tax credit exceeds the basic income
by 181 Euro. Hence, the household optimizes net income if both partners work and receive
the high tax credit. The income difference between households sharing work equally
(50/50) and the single earner household (100/0) amounts to 181 Euro for households
with high incomes. That amount is exactly the difference between the high tax credit
and the lower basic income. Hence, the tax design in which the tax credit exceeds the
basic income gives an incentive to share work equally, while the originally proposed reform
design with the tax credit being smaller than the basic income yields disincentives for a
secondary earner.
For the second budget-neutral scenario we set the withdrawal rate (t1) to 80%, which is
similar to the current withdrawal rate in Germany. In this case the tax rate yielding a
budget neutral reform before labor supply adjustments is 34.9%, which is slightly higher
as in the original proposed reform concept. These adjustments determine a shift of the
threshold from 1,600 Euro per month to 1,000 Euro and a tax credit of 349 Euro. A
negative income tax, thus, results for gross incomes of up to 750 Euro. This set-up causes
disincentives for secondary earners similar to the original proposed basic income concept
(Figure 5). The household decision now is already relevant at the threshold of 1,000
Euro. Above the threshold a household optimizes net income only in case of a single
earner household (100/0). Similar to the original reform proposal the tax credit is by 451
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Figure 5: The Intra-household Working Decision: Alternative with Adjusted Withdrawal
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Euro lower than the basic income. Thus, a possible secondary earner has an incentive to
exit the labor market in order to receive the comparably high basic income.
These theoretical considerations are reflected by our estimated labor supply reactions in
Table 3. Raising the tax rate to 61.3% or the withdrawal rate to 80% reverses labor supply
effects of the original proposed reform (see Table 2). In contrast to an additional labor
supply of about 1 million full-time equivalents, the alternative with an adjusted tax rate
reduces labor supply by 188,886 full-time equivalents (-0.89%) and rising the withdrawal
rate effects labor supply negative by 3,749 full-time equivalents (-0.02%).
Employees work less with regard to the extensive and intensive margin, if we rise the tax
rate. Again, especially women living in couple households adjust their behavior and stop
working to quite a large extent (-335,150 persons). Hence, women in couple households
reduce their labor supply although the first alternative tax system gives an incentive to
share work equally within the household (Figure 4). Their negative labor supply, thus,
must solely be driven by the income effect due to a quite high basic income for children
and women’s estimated high leisure preference. The participation of all other subgroups
increases but to a lower extend as in the original basic income concept. With regard to
working hours (intensive margin) we observe a slight decrease in labor supply of about 1%
for almost all groups, which adds up to a reduction in working hours of 135,882 full-time
equivalents. Hence, the positive effects of the original reform proposal are reversed, as a
consequence of the higher tax rates.
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Table 3: Labor Supply Effects - Budget Neutral Alternatives
Participation Working Hours Total
Persons % FTE % FTE %
Alternative with adjusted tax rate
Total -119,199 -0.51 -135,882 -0.64 -188,886 -0.89
Men 88,392 0.74 -72,598 -0.59 11,527 0.09
Women -207,591 -1.85 -63,284 -0.71 -200,413 -2.25
Singles
Men 43,391 1.32 -5,369 -0.23 35,293 1.49
Women 127,559 3.71 15,286 0.58 120,476 4.58
Couples
Men 45,001 0.47 -67,230 -0.74 -23,766 -0.26
Women -335,150 -2.92 -78,570 -1.35 -320,889 -5.51
Alternative with adjusted withdrawal rate
Total -705,493 -3.04 447,862 2.11 -3,749 -0.02
Men 89,457 0.75 185,428 1.50 282,201 2.29
Women -794,950 -7.09 262,434 2.95 -285,949 -3.21
Singles
Men 42,699 1.30 60,442 2.55 104,955 4.42
Women 22,426 0.65 108,208 4.11 131,684 5.00
Couples
Men 46,759 0.49 124,986 1.38 177,245 1.96
Women -817,376 -7.11 154,226 2.65 -417,634 -7.17
Data Source: SOEP 2004, own calculations.
The second alternative concept creates even higher disincentives for women in couple
households. 817,376 women in couple households stop working. In this setting disincen-
tives for secondary earners (Figure 5), the income effect due to the child basic income
and women’s high preference for leisure in combination cause large negative labor supply
reactions. In addition, rising the withdrawal rate mainly affects women’s labor supply, as
they very often work in part-time jobs with low incomes. Due to lower tax rates for high
incomes, results for the intensive margin are positive for all groups. The positive effects
on working hours mitigate, but cannot outweigh the very negative effects on participation.
Hence, the total labor supply effect is negative but close to zero.
The comparison of the two alternatives shows that the design of a basic income is crucial
with regard to labor supply reactions. The relation between the basic income and the
tax credit decides whether secondary earners are dis- or encouraged to participate on the
labor market. A high tax credit encourages to share work equally between the spouses.
But a high tax credit in the basic income concept discussed here also comes along with
a high tax rate, which yields negative labor supply reactions. In the setting with a high
withdrawal rate the high basic income discourages couple households to participate on
the labor market equally. However, keeping the withdrawal rate at a high level (80%) and
15
Figure 6: Percentile Analysis: Budget Neutral Alternatives
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Data Source: SOEP 2004, own calculations.
therefore lowering the tax rate increases labor supply on the intensive margin. Hence,
both alternatives yield ambiguous results.
The percentile analysis for the alternative concepts are presented in Figure 6. The high
income tax of the first budget neutral alternative yields very high losses in the 9th and
10th decile. Couples without children lose already from the 5th decile on, because they
no longer benefit from income splitting. For the second alternative with an adjusted
withdrawal rate we observe in total gains for all deciles. In this scenario the change to
individual taxation again creates losses for couples without children, which are quite high
in the middle of the income distribution. Families with children benefit by both reform
scenarios and show the highest gains. This visualizes the positive income effect due to a
high child benefit.
Inequality measures for the alternative with a high tax rate indicate a strong reduction
in income inequality, while inequality in case of the high withdrawal rate even seems to
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increase. The Gini coefficient decreases for the first alternative from 0.26 to 0.22 and
increases for the second alternative from 0.26 to 0.29. The Atkinson measure A(0.5)
decreases for the first alternative from 0.05 to 0.04 and A(1) from 0.10 to 0.07. This
indicates an improvement of the lower deciles compared to the upper deciles. For the
second reform alternative A(0.5) increases from 0.05 to 0.06 and A(1) from 0.10 to 0.12.
Hence, inequality measures support the result of the percentile analysis, that the higher
tax rate leads to redistribution from the top to the bottom deciles. For the second
alternative all deciles gain in total, but the upper deciles seem to benefit more from the
low tax rate.
The results with regard to labor supply and distribution show the general trade-off be-
tween equity and efficiency. A high tax rate increases equity but decreases work incentives.
Instead, a high withdrawal rate leads to more inequality but yields higher work incentives.
6 Conclusion
The introduction of an unconditional basic income in Germany would replace all current
social transfers by a negative income tax scheme that guarantees every citizen a minimum
income regardless of the employment status. The reform proposal discussed in this paper
combines several instruments such as a change from joint to individual taxation and the
introduction of a negative income tax, a flat tax system and lump sum payments for health
insurance. The proposal of such a basic income concept has an appealing simplicity and
could indeed reduce the complexity of the current tax system.
But our simulation results show that the originally proposed concept of the German con-
servative party would yield a very high budgetary deficit. Hence, the original basic income
design seems not feasible, despite very positive labor supply reactions. We therefore esti-
mate the effects of two budget-neutral alternatives – one with an adjusted tax rate and
one with an adjusted withdrawal rate.
Theoretical labor supply considerations point out, that we need to focus on the impact of
a shift from joint to individual taxation and the introduction of a negative income tax, as
these changes directly affect labor supply decisions in the family context. We show that
despite the introduction of individual taxation – which annuls the current disincentives
of secondary earners in the current joint taxation system – the basic income concept
nevertheless can induce disincentives for secondary earners to participate on the labor
market. Due to the introduction of a negative income tax that is based on individual
income, households optimize their joint income in the original proposed scenario and the
alternative with an adjusted withdrawal rate, if they opt for a single earner in the family.
In basic income designs, in which the unconditional basic income (for low incomes) is
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higher than the tax credit (for high incomes) single earner households always benefit from
the high unconditional basic income for the partner, who is not in work. In contrast,
the alternative with a high tax rate gives an incentive to share work equally between the
spouses, as the tax credit is higher than the basic income.
According to theory, we estimate for the alternative with a high withdrawal rate very
negative labor supply reactions of women in couple households. This result is driven by
the disincentives of the high unconditional basic income and the estimated high leisure
preferences of women. Although the alternative for which we adjust the tax rate (high tax
credit) does not induce disincentives for secondary earners, we still observe a (comparably
small) reduction in the labor supply of women living in couple households. This reaction,
thus, must be caused by a high income effect due to the high basic income for children
and the women’s estimated high preference for leisure. Taking distributional analysis
and intensive labor supply reactions into account, the general equity-efficiency trade-off is
unveiled. A high tax rate yields negative labor supply reactions (intensive margin), while
the income inequality of the status quo seems to be mitigated in this case. In contrast, a
high withdrawal rate affects the working hours not as negative, but seems to widen the
income distribution.
We need to add here that our estimations do not account for the time women spent
caring for their children. This in fact can cause an overestimation of women’s leisure
preferences, which means that our estimated negative effects can be seen as an upper
bound. Furthermore, our microsimulation study can only examine the effects of a basic
income on labor supply. Demand side adjustments or restrictions are neglected here.
In order to circumvent the equity-efficiency trade-off, future research should try to find
tax rates which strike a balance between the efficiency of work incentives and income
inequality. At the same time, a basic income concept must guarantee budget neutrality
and avoid disincentives for secondary earners. Thus, our analysis of two extreme scenarios
– with either a high tax rate or a high withdrawal rate – could be complemented by a
simulation of a promising scenario which yields budget neutrality by raising both tax
parameters to the same level. Such a scenario would avoid the revealed disincentives for
secondary earners in the basic income concept.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Single Women
coeff SE z P < z
Disposable Income 7.40 2.86 2.62 0.01
DisposableIncome2 0.23 0.05 4.26 0.00
Disposable Income X Leisure -2.09 0.61 -3.45 0.00
Leisure 77.20 19.93 3.87 0.00
Leisure2 -7.82 2.38 -3.29 0.00
Leisure x High-skilled 1.85 1.31 1.41 0.16
Leisure x Low-skilled 2.80 1.37 2.05 0.04
Leisure x East -0.14 0.38 -0.37 0.71
Leisure x Nationality 1.55 0.61 2.53 0.01
Leisure x Age 0.38 0.44 0.86 0.39
Leisure ∗Age2 0.003 0.001 2.26 0.02
Leisure2 ∗Age -0.07 0.06 -1.25 0.21
Leisure x Disabled -0.16 1.40 -0.11 0.91
Leisure x Children < 7 4.30 0.56 7.70 0.00
Leisure x Children 7-16 1.16 0.26 4.48 0.00
Leisure x Children ≥ 17 0.50 0.31 1.63 0.10
Dummy Full-time Employment 0.40 0.38 1.05 0.29
Dummy Part-time -1.43 0.29 -4.99 0.00
N 3890
Log likelihood -976.26
Data Source: SOEP 2004, own calculations.
Table A.2: Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Single Men
coeff SE z P < z
Disposable Income 9.76 2.71 3.60 0.00
DisposableIncome2 0.08 0.04 1.76 0.08
Disposable Income X Leisure -2.35 0.59 -4.00 0.00
Leisure 68.55 21.17 3.24 0.00
Leisure2 -6.18 2.49 -2.49 0.01
Leisure x High-skilled 1.71 2.14 0.80 0.43
Leisure x Low-skilled 2.31 2.19 1.06 0.29
Leisure x East 0.47 0.37 1.28 0.20
Leisure x Nationality 0.76 0.85 0.90 0.37
Leisure x Age -0.79 0.47 -1.69 0.09
Leisure2 ∗Age 0.10 0.06 1.67 0.10
Leisure ∗Age2 0.001 0.001 0.69 0.49
Leisure x Disabled 0.96 0.88 1.09 0.28
Dummy Full-time Employment 3.94 0.26 14.86 0.00
N 3000
Log likelihood -669.23
Data Source: SOEP 2004, own calculations.
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Table A.3: Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Flexible Couples
coeff SE z P < z
Disposable Income 17.11 2.28 7.52 0.00
DisposableIncome2 0.27 0.04 6.17 0.00
Leisure Husband x Leisure Wife -2.51 0.53 -4.70 0.00
Disposable Income x Leisure Husband -2.85 0.33 -8.67 0.00
Disposable Income x Leisure Wife -1.48 0.29 -5.14 0.00
Leisure Husband 51.15 7.08 7.22 0.00
LeisureHusband2 -0.93 0.60 -1.56 0.12
Leisure Husband x East -9.49 2.69 -3.53 0.00
Leisure Husband x Nationality -0.34 0.42 -0.80 0.42
Leisure Husband x Leisure Wife x East 2.41 0.67 3.60 0.00
Leisure Husband x Leisure Wife x Nationality -0.16 0.10 -1.53 0.13
Leisure Husband x High-skilled 2.16 1.28 1.69 0.09
Leisure Husband x Low-skilled 3.00 1.30 2.30 0.02
Leisure Husband x Age -0.35 0.09 -3.70 0.00
LeisureHusbandxAge2 0.01 0.00 4.42 0.00
Leisure Husband x Disabled 0.56 0.77 0.73 0.47
Leisure Wife 94.39 7.03 13.42 0.00
LeisureWife2 -8.18 0.62 -13.16 0.00
Leisure Wife x East -11.45 2.55 -4.50 0.00
Leisure Wife x Nationality -0.34 0.42 -0.80 0.42
Leisure Wife x High-skilled 1.75 0.78 2.24 0.03
Leisure Wife x Low-skilled 1.93 0.82 2.35 0.02
Leisure Wife x Age -0.34 0.09 -3.56 0.00
LeisureWife ∗Age2 0.01 0.00 4.23 0.00
Leisure Wife x Disabled 0.19 1.43 0.13 0.89
LeisurexChildren < 7 3.51 0.26 13.56 0.00
Leisure x Children 7-16 1.28 0.12 10.83 0.00
Leisure ∗ Children ≥ 17 0.52 0.13 4.00 0.00
Dummy Full-time Employment Husband 4.88 0.20 24.86 0.00
Dummy Full-time Employment Wife 0.89 0.24 3.74 0.00
Dummy Part-time Employment Wife -0.53 0.21 -2.57 0.01
Dummy Employment Both Spouses -0.16 0.18 -0.86 0.39
N 65075
Log likelihood -5859.73
Data Source: SOEP 2004, own calculations.
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Table A.4: Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Couples with Inflexible
Partner
coeff SE z P < z
Disposable Income 0.80 1.77 0.45 0.65
DisposableIncome2 0.56 0.08 7.35 0.00
Disposable Income x Leisure -1.26 0.38 -3.34 0.00
Leisure 63.95 21.94 2.91 0.00
Leisure x Household Head Female 0.53 0.74 0.71 0.48
Leisure -5.41 2.69 -2.01 0.04
Leisure x Leisure inflex. Spouse 0.52 0.25 2.11 0.04
Leisure x High-skilled x Female 0.55 1.17 0.47 0.64
Leisure x Low-skilled x Female 1.53 1.24 1.23 0.22
Leisure x High-skilled x Male -0.74 1.23 -0.60 0.55
Leisure x Low-skilled x Male -1.15 1.33 -0.87 0.39
Leisure x Age -0.87 0.47 -1.88 0.06
LeisurexAge2 0.01 0.00 3.26 0.00
Leisure2 ∗Age 0.06 0.05 1.05 0.29
Leisure x East 1.61 0.65 2.47 0.01
Leisure x East x Household Head Female -3.45 0.72 -4.78 0.00
Leisure x Nationality -1.61 0.57 -2.79 0.01
LeisurexChildren < 7 1.22 0.69 1.77 0.08
Leisure x Children 7-16 1.00 0.27 3.66 0.00
LeisurexChildren ≥ 17 0.51 0.22 2.33 0.02
Leisure x Male x Disabled 0.71 1.15 0.62 0.53
Dummy Part-time Employment Wife -0.22 0.22 -1.00 0.32
Dummy Full-time Employment Wife 0.84 0.34 2.49 0.01
Dummy Full-time Employment Husband 3.59 0.35 10.28 0.00
DummyEmploymentxChildren < 7 -0.44 0.40 -1.09 0.28
Dummy Employment x Children 7-16 0.27 0.16 1.70 0.09
N 4610
Log likelihood -1178.85
Data Source: SOEP 2004, own calculations.
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